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NOTES 
THE UNITED STATES-CANADIAN AUTOMOTIVE 
TRADING RELATIONSHIP AND THE LEGALITY 
OF THE CANADIAN DUTY REMISSION 
PROGRAM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The automotive industry influences the entire U.S. economy. 
This huge industrial structure directly affects over four million 
jobs in the United States.1 In terms of foreign trade in 1985, the 
United States exported approximately $6 billion worth of new pas-
senger cars to foreign nations; 96 percent of those automobiles 
went to Canada.2 This is an illustration of the U.S. automotive in-
dustry's direct interest in the U.S.-Canadian trading relationship, 
and the desire to obtain the potential benefits of a "broadened 
trading relationship" between the two countries. 3 
Presently, the United States and Canada have a unique duty-
free automotive trading arrangement which is distinguishable from 
those of other automotive trading nations. The agreement was es-
tablished by the United States-Canadian Agreement Concerning 
Automotive Products of 1965 (Auto Pact);' The fundamental prin-
ciple of free trade mandates the removal of trade barriers, such as 
import duties. 6 Free trade between two trading countries enhances 
the general welfare of a nation's economy by allowing greater ex-
change and production gains within the respective countries. 6 
1. Roy & Rassuli, International Trade Barriers and the United States Automotive In-
dustry, 14 U. ToL. L. REV. 263 (1982-83). 
2. U.S.-Canada Automotive Trade: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabi-
lization of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(Sept. 23, 1986) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Thomas Hanna, President and Chief 
Executive for the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc. 
(MVMA), concerning the United States-Canada Auto Pact: particularly in connection with 
the negotiations currently underway between these two governments concerning the possi-
bility of establishing a border free trade arrangement). 
3. Id. In the past, Canada has been among the leading trading partners of the United 
States. Id. 
4. Agreement Concerning Automotive Products, Jan. 16, 1965, United States-Canada, 
17 U.S.T. 1372, T.l.A.S. No. 6093 [hereinafter Auto Pact]. 
5. Roy & Rassuli, supra note 1, at 268. 
6. Id. The benefits of free trade accrue from "market rationalization and efficiencies" 
that in the past have been illustrated as a compliment to the reduction of trade barriers 
between two countries. Moreover, free trade increases income. Id. 
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The purpose of this Note will be to examine the importance of 
the well established U.S.-Canadian automotive trading relation-
ship. The main focus will be placed on the implementation of the 
Canadian Duty Remission Program and its impact on U.S. trading 
forces in relation to international agreements. In Part II, the Auto 
Pact's objectives, background, provisions and operations will be 
shown to express the vitality of such an agreement in an interna-
tional trading relationship between two trading allies. In Part Ill, 
the Canadian Duty Remission Program will be explored through 
an analysis of how the program is used by the Canadian Govern-
ment to create various investment incentives. A discussion will 
then follow to illustrate the origins and establishment of the pro-
gram and how it has progressed and operated for the benefit of the 
Canadian Government and its economy. Next, the Remission Pro-
gram's legality and its alleged violation of several international 
agreements with manifest adverse effects on the United States will 
be examined. Part IV will analyze the various options available to 
the United States with regards to the most appropriate course of 
action that the United States should undertake in considering the 
Canadian Duty Remission Program as a factor of international 
trade. Part V will conclude with final suggestions for approaching a 
healthy U.S.-Canadian automotive trading relationship. 
II. THE AUTO PACT: OBJECTIVES, BACKGROUND, PRO-
VISIONS AND OPERATION 
The Auto Pact of 1965 was an important and successful step 
taken by the United States and Canada to create a globally com-
petitive North American automotive industry.7 The effect of the 
U.S. and Canadian free-trade policy on automobiles and most au-
tomotive products has effectively integrated each country's auto-
motive market, and has entitled the producers to gain the benefits 
of increased efficiencies through the economies of scale. 8 
7. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Thomas Hanna). Governing the largest single 
automotive market in the world requires departures from each country's ordinary trade and 
investment practices. The Auto Pact has been a dominant factor in the expansion of bilat-
eral trading arrangements. Id. 
8. Id. As the Auto Pact has encouraged the integration and rationalization of U.S. and 
Canadian automotive operations, it has improved productivity and has resulted in the pro-
duction of optimum levels of components and vehicles. This increased productivity is of 
equal importance to both the U.S. and Canadian economies. Furthermore, consumers have 
benefitted from improved access to the other country's markets for automotive products. Id. 
When the Canadian Value Added content level is at least 50 percent, consumers are 
permitted to purchase automobiles in Canada and bring them across the U.S. border with-
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The original function of the Auto Pact was to eliminate the 
various imposed duties placed upon vehicles and original equip-
ment parts shipped between the United States and Canada.9 The 
intention was to create a single North American market.10 The 
Auto Pact was created to establish a free-trade agreement between 
the United States and Canada in response to the sudden over-
whelming bilateral trading problems of the automotive industry.11 
A compromise was agreed upon, although neither country had the 
intention to negotiate such a trading arrangement at that time.12 
The U.S.-Canadian automotive trading problems of the early 
1960's were initiated by the invocation of unilateral actions by 
each country.13 In the late 1950's and early 1960's, the Canadian 
Government was concerned with the problem of its external net 
automotive trade deficit, as well as with the reduction of Canadian 
competitiveness as a producer of automobiles.14 The Canadian au-
tomotive industry was small and inefficient in that it only pro-
out paying a duty. Furthermore, automobile manufacturers may access vehicles and original 
equipment parts duty-free. "Canadian Value Added" refers to the amount of Canadian con-
tent in an automobile manufactured in Canada. For example, 50 percent Canadian Value 
Added means that at least 50 percent of the Canadian manufactured automobile contains a 
50 percent value of the aggregate of Canadian produced parts, manufacturing labor time, 
management compensation, overhead and other related expenses classified under an item 
that is Canadian produced. Id. (testimony of the International Union, United Automobile, 
Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), concerning the United 
States-Canada Auto Pact). 
9. See id. 
10. Id. The objectives of the Auto Pact were quickly achieved and the Canadian Duty 
Remission Program was eliminated, hence, enhancing bilateral trade between the two coun-
tries. Id.; see infra notes 11, 17 and accompanying text. 
11. Reisman, The Relevance of the Auto Pact for Other Sectoral Arrangements, 10 
CAN. U.S. L.J. 75, 76 (1985); see also Hearing, supra note 2 (opening statement of John J. 
LaFalce, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the House Commit-
tee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, concerning the hearing on U.S.-Canadian auto-
motive trade). The Auto Pact was negotiated between the United States and Canada as a 
direct result of the establishment of a Canadian duty remission scheme of the early 1960's. 
Id. 
12. Reisman, supra note 11, at 75-76. 
13. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Thomas Hanna). 
14. Trezise, The Relevance of the Auto Pact to Other Sectoral Arrangements, 10 CAN. 
U.S. L.J. 63, 65 (1985); see also Note, Canada-U.S. Automotive Agreement: the Sectoral 
Approach, 8 J. WORLD TRADE L. 176 (1974). The alleged domination of the Canadian econ-
omy by the United States in the 1960's became a major political issue. Since the automobile 
industry was a prominent and maturing industrial sector in both the United States and 
Canada, it became the first area of concern between the two countries. Id.; see also Hearing, 
supra note 2 (testimony of the UAW). Unlike today, in 1965, automobile sales in the United 
States and Canada by non-North American producers were relatively small, and thus, were 
not of a major concern to these two economies at that time. Id.; see also CANADIAN-AMERI-
CAN COMMITTEE, THE CANADA-US. AUTOMOTIVE AGREEMENT: AN EVALUATION (1970). 
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duced models in limited quantities.16 The Canadian Government 
became increasingly concerned about the future growth of its mar-
ket segment as part of the U.S.-Canadian automotive sector.16 
As a result, the Canadian polity initiated a major change in 
the policies of its automotive industry and commenced the unilat-
eral action of a duty remission program, "designed to increase the 
dollar value of Canadian content in exported automotive parts. "17 
The duty remission scheme evolved in two stages. At first, Cana-
dian manufacturers were allowed duty remissions on imported au-
tomatic transmissions and engine block parts.18 Such remissions 
were equivalent to any increase achieved on a dollar for dollar ba-
sis on exported Canadian produced components.19 After reviewing 
the apparent success of the program over a one-year period, the 
Sovereign of Canada commenced the second stage and broadened 
the duty remission program policy. 20 This entailed the offering of 
remissions on duties for any vehicle or original equipment compo-
15. Note, supra note 14, at 176; see also Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Thomas 
Hanna). The deficient Canadian market operated at a 60 percent production rate compared 
to that of the United States. Id. 
16. Id. The Canadian Government initiated consultations with those vehicle producers 
situated in Canada. Each manufacturer submitted a "letter of undertaking" to the Canadian 
Government to state its concerns. These statements contained a description of each firm's 
expectations of its production rates over the upcoming four years subject to the necessary 
governmental qualifications, market conditions and other factors beyond the individual 
company's control. The summations of the companies undertook to: 
Id. 
(1) increase the total Canadian Value Added in vehicles and original equipment 
parts by an amount equal to 60 percent of the growth in the value of passenger car 
sales in Canada and 50 percent in the case of commercial vehicles; and (2) increase 
the Canadian Value Added in vehicles and original parts by a total of Canadian 
$260 million over and above that achieved in model year 1964. 
17. Reisman, supra note 11, at 76; Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Thomas 
Hanna); see also id. (testimony of Marc Santucci, Director of the Office of International 
Development of the State of Michigan, concerning the unfair trade practices instituted by 
the Government of Canada combined with the Canadian safeguards found in the Auto 
Pact). 
In November of 1962, the Canadian Government instituted the first duty remission 
plan to reduce its growing trade deficit with the United States in the automotive sector. The 
plan was expanded in November of 1963 for the purpose of promoting Canadian made parts 
and increasing the Canadian Value Added in vehicles sold in Canada. The increase of Cana-
dian parts to the United States rose from $1 million in 1960 to $45 million in 1964. Id. 
18. Reisman, supra note 11, at 76; see also Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of 
Thomas Hanna). 
19. Reisman, supra note 11, at 76; see also Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of 
Thomas Hanna). 
20. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Thomas Hanna). The result illustrated, that 
the dollar value of Canadian exports of automobiles and components subsequently increased 
over 700 percent between 1962 and 1964. Id.; see also id. (testimony of Marc Santucci). 
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nent imported, if matched by the equivalent export on any vehicle 
or original equipment part. 21 
The U.S. automotive producers' reaction to the Canadian duty 
remission scheme was hostile. A countervailing duty petition was 
filed by the Modine Corporation of the United States, an automo-
tive parts radiator manufacturer, against the Canadian Govern-
ment's automotive export program. 22 The petition charged that 
those tariff remissions under the Canadian scheme constituted a 
subsidy defined as a "bounty or grant, direct or indirect" pursuant 
to the terms of the United States Tariff Act of 1930.23 
In response to the duty petition, the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment initiated a countervailing duty investigation to determine 
whether the Canadian export measure was equivalent to an illegal 
subsidy.24 However, the investigation was never completed because 
both countries were sufficiently concerned about the impact that 
an illegal trade practices ruling would have had on trade and other 
international relations.26 Thus, to avoid trading problems, U.S. and 
Canadian officials embarked on discussions to design an agreement 
for the promotion of more efficient and productive automotive in-
dustries and a more rational international automotive trade. 26 
After the successful completion of the Auto Pact negotiations, 
21. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Thomas Hanna); see also Reisman, supra note 
11, at 176. 
22. Note, supra note 14, at 176, 177; see also Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Marc 
Santucci). The submitted petition requested a 25 percent duty on imports of automotive 
components from Canada. Id. 
23. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 361, 46 Stat. 590 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1303 
(1930)); see also Letter from John D. Dingell (Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce) to Clayton Yeutter (U.S. 
Trade Representative) (August 19, 1986) [hereinafter Letter] (discussing the Canadian Duty 
Remission Program). Under § 303 of the Tariff Act, imports of Canadian automotive parts 
which benefit from the duty remission program may be subject to countervailing duties if 
such imports cause or threaten material injury to the industry in the United States that 
provides such automotive parts. Id. For a more detailed explanation of Countervailing Duty 
Law, see infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. A countervailing duty is a legal method 
that a country may use to def end against another country's unfair trade practice such as a 
subsidized export. Id. 
24. Reisman, supra note 11, at 76. 
25. Id. at 77; see also Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Thomas Hanna). A state-
ment by President Johnson asserted that if additional legal trading weapons were initiated, 
there would have been the likelihood of "a wasteful contest of strokes and counterstrokes" 
between the two countries. Id. 
26. Auto Pact, supra note 4; see also Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Thomas 
Hanna). If both governments did not attempt to develop an agreement to further integrate 
the separate national automotive industries, the continuation of unilateral actions by each 
country could have concluded in the creation of largely separate automotive sectors in each 
country with a relatively small amount of bilateral automotive trade. Id. 
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the overall objectives of the United States and Canada were out-
lined in the preamble to the agreement.27 Both countries acknowl-
edged the importance and influence of the automotive industry on 
the continued growth of the entire economy.28 The two govern-
ments' foremost desire was to stimulate positive economic relations 
between their countries by providing a more efficient international 
trading policy that would increase the channels of product accessi-
bility to the marketplace.29 This objective was recognized to be 
best achieved by the reduction or elimination of those trade barri-
ers which would impede the potentials of free trade. 30 As a result, 
it was decided that the agreement should not operate within any 
time limitations, and a termination of the agreement would only be 
effective 12 months from the date by which one government gives 
written notice to the other of its intentions. 31 
Under Article I of the Auto Pact, the Governments of the 
United States and Canada sought several objectives that would 
create a more affluent bilateral automotive trade. First, each gov-
ernment sought to establish "the creation of a broader market for 
automotive products within which the full benefits of specialization 
and large scale production can be achieved."32 Second, they sought 
to provide for "the liberalization of the United States and Cana-
dian automotive trade in respect of tariff barriers and other factors 
tending to impede it, with a view to enabling the industries of both 
countries to participate on a fair and equitable basis in the ex-
panding total market of the two countries."33 Third, each sought to 
achieve "the development of conditions in which market forces 
may operate effectively to attain the most economic pattern of in-
vestment, production and trade."34 In the conclusion of article I, 
27. Auto Pact, supra note 4. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. art. VII. 
32. Id. art. l(a). 
33. Id. art. l(b). The Auto Pact does not include the definition of what is "fair and 
equitable." See infra note 34. 
34. Auto Pact, supra note 4, art. l(c); see also Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of 
Thomas Hanna). As the Auto Pact states that the market forces shall determine the pattern 
of investment, production and trade, the "fair and equitable" clause of article Il(b) was 
interpreted differently by Canada and the United States, respectively. The former under-
stood it to mean closing the gap between the value of Canadian automotive production and 
the value of Canadian purchases of North American produced motor vehicles. The latter's 
interpretation was understood as a response to the maintenance of the U.S. trade surplus 
with Canada in automotive equipment that existed prior to the Auto Pact. Id. 
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each government was charged with the responsibility of avoiding 
those actions that would frustrate the achievement of the article I 
objectives. 36 
The core of the Auto Pact is contained in article II. Here, each 
government pledged to permit duty-free treatment to the imports 
of certain automotive products that originated in the other coun-
try. 36 Each government's import provisions are illustrated in the 
Annex to the Auto Pact.37 Annex A governs those Canadian im-
ports from the United States which permit duty-free treatment of 
certain vehicles and original equipment parts, when the importer 
qualifies as a "manufacturer."38 Safeguards were incorporated into 
the Auto Pact by the Canadians, because of their fears that the 
compromises afforded to the U.S. manufacturers from the negotia-
tions would result in a predominantly U.S. production sector serv-
35. Auto Pact, supra note 4. 
36. Id.; see also Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Thomas Hanna); Gotlieb, Canada-
U.S. Relations: Legislation, Regulation, and the Management of Confiict, 9 CAN. Bus. L.J. 
485 (1985). The U.S. pledge to the Auto Pact was conditional upon Congressional approval 
of Public Law 80-283 (signed Oct. 21, 1965), because of the constitutional separation of 
powers in general international policy-making. Foreign governments are faced with a 
"double squeeze" as first they must negotiate an agreement in good faith with the Executive 
Branch of the U.S. Government, and then the process must begin anew as the Senate has to 
ratify those international treaties. It is evident that U.S. legislative and regulatory develop-
ments could affect Canadian interests. Id. 
37. Auto Pact, supra note 4, annex A; see also Hearing, supra note 2 (opening state-
ment of John J. LaFalce). The agreement permits duty-free treatment between the United 
States and Canada for new vehicles, including cars, trucks, buses and original equipment 
parts. It excludes this special treatment for off-highway vehicles, replacement parts and ac-
cessories, and batteries. The provisions differ with regard to specific parts as the United 
States also allows duty-free treatment on imported used cars from Canada, while they are 
excluded from coverage by Canada. On the other hand, Canada permits the duty-free entry 
of tires and tubes, while the United States excludes them from coverage under the agree-
ment. Id. 
38. Id.; see also U.S. INT'L TRADE CoMM'N, OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PRO-
GRAM (No. 1871, June 1986) [hereinafter TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM]. The Canadian Gov-
ernment's application of the Auto Pact does not fully constitute a free-trade arrangement. A 
duty-free status is administered only to those automotive imports from a "bona fide manu-
facturer" of motor vehicles. On the contrary, the United States extends duty-free treatment 
to all original equipment automotive imports from Canada, regardless of production by a 
manufacturer or an individual. Id. at 132; see also Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of 
Thomas Hanna). A "manufacturer" is defined as one having produced vehicles of the speci-
fied class during each quarter of the model year of 1964. For each class of vehicles sold by 
the company, a maintained ratio of net sales value of its production of motor vehicles in 
Canada is to be preserved at not less than the ratio of the model year of 1964, and not lower 
than the ratio of 75 to 100. In addition, the Canadian Value Added level must be main-
tained in absolute dollar terms at least as great as that achieved in the model year of 1964. 
Id. 
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ing the Canadian market. 89 Automotive items shipped into the 
United States from Canada, include motor vehicles and those 
fabricated components to be used as original equipment in 
automobiles, with the exception of special purpose vehicles and 
other accessories such as tires and tubes.40 These imports will be 
accorded duty-free treatment only if the content derived is at least 
50 percent Canadian Value Added. 41 This provision was incorpo-
rated into the Auto Pact to prevent foreign producers with limited 
Canadian operations from using Canada to circumvent the U.S. 
tariff. 42 It was further reasoned that the content requirement 
would reduce the use of components from foreign countries by the 
major U.S. -Canadian manufacturers. 48 
The Auto Pact has been a valuable mechanism for the integra-
tion of the North American automotive industry, by limiting the 
trade barriers between the United States and Canada."" This re-
sulting collectiveness has contributed to the improved utilization 
of both countries' automotive manufacturing facilities and the 
achievement of important production economies in automotive op-
erations. 45 During the past twenty years, the Auto Pact has not 
39. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of the UAW); see also TRADE AGREEMENTS PRO-
GRAM, supra note 38. The Canadian Government demanded that certain safeguards be in-
corporated within the agreement, for the purpose of securing their access to the greater U.S. 
market. This was demanded, although they refused to acknowledge that they were overly 
influenced by the huge size of the U.S. market. Id. at 132. 
40. Auto Pact, supra note 4, annex A; see also Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of the 
UAW). 
41. Auto Pact, supra note 4, annex A; see also Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of the 
UAW). 
42. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Thomas Hanna); see also TRADE AGREEMENTS 
PROGRAM, supra note 38. According to the agreement, the United States provides duty-free 
treatment for those motor vehicles that have a 50 percent North American value. Thus, 
Canada can incorporate duty-free components from non-North American countries into 
automobiles manufactured in Canada and export these products duty-free to the United 
States. Id. at 132. 
43. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Thomas Hanna). 
44. Id.; see also TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, supra note 38. "The Auto Pact governs 
the most significant sectoral flow of trade between the United States and Canada." Id. at 
132; see also Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, News Release 
(Sept. 23, 1986) [hereinafter News Release] . The Auto Pact fostered the growth of an inte-
grated automotive market and has been one of the most powerful influences in the develop-
ment of the North American motor vehicle industry for the past two decades. Id. 
45. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Thomas Hanna). Since 1964, manufacturers 
have reduced the number of various models of motor vehicles produced in Canada, which in 
turn lowered the cost of Canadian production. The reduction in the differing model produc-
tion enabled the Canadian manufacturers to use their machinery more effectively through 
larger quantity production runs for specialization. Production of the many lower volume 
items had been relocated into plants where the benefits of higher volume production could 
8
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 14, No. 1 [1987], Art. 5
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol14/iss1/5
1987] U.S.-Canadian Automotive Trading 47 
been altered since it has served as a powerful structure economi-
cally, socially and politically between the two countries. 
The success of the North American automotive trading indus-
try is apparent as bilateral automotive trade has grown more than 
60 times exceeding $45 billion, and has become the single largest 
product of trade between the United States and Canada.46 Al-
though the Auto Pact has been observed as statistically successful, 
its effectiveness may be diminishing because of intense industry 
competition by those non-American companies that are not cov-
be achieved. Because of the agreement, both countries were able to locate their automotive 
productions in the most practical locations, thereby eliminating the duplication of produc-
tion facilities. Id. 
46. Id. In 1985, the United States exported 833,449 motor vehicles to Canada, a level 
equal to 73 percent of 1985 Canadian sales of North American produced motor vehicles 
(representing 7.3 percent of 1985 U.S. production); compared to 1965, the United States 
exported only 64,000 motor vehicles, a rate of only 8.5 percent of Canadian sales of North 
American produced motor vehicles (representing 0.6 percent of U.S. production). Further-
more, in 1985, Canada exported 1,556,050 motor vehicles to the United States, a level equal 
to 12.9 percent of the 1985 U.S. sales of North American produced motor vehicles (repre-
senting 81 percent of 1985 Canadian production); compared to 1965, Canada exported only 
48,000 vehicles, a rate of only 0.5 percent of U.S. sales of North American produced motor 
vehicles (representing 6 percent of Canadian production). Id.; see also TRADE AGREEMENTS 
PROGRAM, supra note 38. 
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ered by the agreement:" Furthermore, the Canadian Government's 
current Duty Remission Program gives the foreign automotive pro-
ducers, other than the United States producers, duty remission re-
bates of either 70 or 100 percent, contingent upon the individual 
company's remission order with the Canadian Government.48 An 
U.S.-Canadian automotive trade, 1964-85 
(In millions of U.S. dollars) 
Canadian imports 
Year U.S. imports Canadian imports1 less U.S. 
imports 
1964 76 640 563 
1965 231 889 658 
1966 819 1,375 556 
1967 1,406 1,889 483 
1968 2,274 2,634 360 
1969 3,061 3,144 83 
1970 3,132 2,935 -196 
1971 4,000 3,803 -197 
1972 4,595 4,496 -99 
1973 5,301 5:726 426 
1974 5,544 6,777 1,233 
1975 5,801 7,653 1,842 
1976 7,989 9,005 1,016 
1977 9,267 10,290 1,023 
1978 10,493 10,964 471 
1979 9,715 12,274 2,559 
1980 8,780 10,552 1,773 
1981 10,618 12,055 1,437 
1982 13,292 10,971 -2,321 
1983 16,940 14,779 -2,161 
1984 23,047 18,996 -4,051 
1985 24,726 21,450 -3,276 
1 Canadian import data converted to U.S. dollars. 
Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, except 
as noted. 
Note-Data exclude trade in materials for use in the manufacture of automotive parts 
and are adjusted to reflect transaction values for vehicles. 
Id. at 133. 
47. Id.; see also News Release, supra note 46. When the Auto Pact was signed in 1965, 
the companies that were covered by its provisions accounted for more than 99 percent of 
those vehicles produced in the United States and Canada. A future outlook could forecast 
that "given the growing number of foreign-based production facilities in both countries, the 
Auto Pact could apply to only 75% of the North American automobile production by 1990." 
Id. 
48. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Thomas Hanna). A "two-tiered" policy with 
different rules, commitments, and standards has become a clear trend in the Canadian envi-
ronment, because of the declining coverage of the Auto Pact and the implementation of the 
Canadian Duty Remission Program. Id.; see also Memorandum from Alan Homer to Am-
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analysis of the Canadian Duty Remission Program must be con-
ducted to determine its legality within the operation provisions of 
the Auto Pact and its relationship to U.S.-Canadian trade. 
III. THE CANADIAN DUTY REMISSION PROGRAM 
A. AN EXPLANATION 
The Canadian Duty Remission Program (Remission Program), 
is being used by the Canadian Government to create investment 
incentives for non-Auto Pact countries, in order to increase the 
value of the Canadian automotive industry."9 The Remission Pro-
gram permits those foreign automotive producers who are not 
bound by the terms of the Auto Pact, to receive a remission of 
duties on the imports of motor vehicles in proportion to the ex-
ports of original equipment parts for which that producer is re-
sponsible. 60 "The Canadian duty remission program reduces the ef-
fective tariff advantage enjoyed by domestic automotive 
manufacturers under the Pact."61 Presently, automobile imports 
into Canada require a 10.2 percent duty payment by foreign auto-
motive manufacturers on the value of those imports. 62 As the duty 
remission rebates become more popular, foreign manufacturers pay 
less duties on those automobiles that are imported into Canada. 63 
Furthermore, the duty remission benefits that are given to the for-
eign producers adversely affect the domestic suppliers. 64 It is ap-
parent that the Canadian plan is designed to encourage foreign au-
tomotive manufacturers to establish plants and buy parts in 
Canada. 66 Thus, the traditional use of duties in international trade 
is now being used by the Canadian Government to provide a re-
mission benefit in an attempt to attract automotive manufacturers. 
bassador Clayton Yeutter (July 22, 1986) [hereinafter Memorandum] (concerning the legal 
status of Canadian duty remission programs in the automotive sector). The U.S. based auto-
motive producers do not receive duty remission benefits, because motor vehicles and quali-
fied components are already imported into Canada duty-free under the Auto Pact. Id. 
49. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of the UAW). 
50. Id. For example, "[i]f Honda of Canada arranges for a Canadian parts producer to 
ship original equipment parts to its United States plant, Honda can deduct the value of 
those parts from its total of imports of cars into Canada; the amount of duties owed to the 
Canadian Government is, thereby, reduced." Id. 
51. Id. (testimony of Marc Santucci). 
52. Id. The "present" duty on motor vehicles refers to the point in time when this 
paper was written. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Letter, supra note 23. 
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B. THE ORIGINS AND ESTABLISHMENT 
The origins of duty remission programs date back to the early 
1960's, but the current Remission Program was established by the 
Government of Canada under section 17 of the Canadian Financial 
Administration Act. H The statutory authority to implement this 
act, whereby providing the remission of duties and taxes upon im-
ports, originated with the intention of benefiting the economy in 
light of a public interest. 67 The Canadian Cabinet established a 
general policy of duty remissions in the automotive sector that al-
lows for a case by case plan to be applied separately to each com-
pany participating in the program. 68 Each eligible company in the 
program will operate pursuant to one of the two levels of the gen-
eral policy, depending upon the foreign automotive producer's 
commitment to build significant manufacturing facilities in Can-
ada.69 Under both levels of the Remission Program, the duty re-
mitted results from the reduction of the dutiable value of the im-
port. 60 A total of 10 foreign automakers are eligible for the 
remission of import duties.61 
C. THE PROVISIONS AND OPERATION 
The two levels on which the Remission Program operate are a 
duty remission level of 70 percent and another of 100 percent.62 
The first level applies to those non-American automakers that sell 
their automotive products in Canada but do not operate a major 
manufacturing facility within its borders.63 The available duty re-
mission credit is applied to the value of the motor vehicles im-
ported "equal to 703 of the Canadian Value Added in its exports 
56. Canadian Financial Administration Act, § 17, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, C. 170, S.4; see 
also supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
57. Memorandum, supra note 48. 
58. Id. 
59. U.S. DEP'T OF COM., CANADIAN DUTY REMISSION PROGRAM, U.S. DEP'T OF COM. (June 
10, 1986) [hereinafter REMISSION PROGRAM]. 
60. Id. 
61. Letter, supra note 23. The qualifying companies under the Remission Program in-
clude: BMW, Honda, Jaguar, Mazda, Mercedes-Benz, Nissan, Peugeot, Subaru, Toyota, and 
Volkswagen. Different remission orders apply to the individual companies. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. REMISSION PROGRAM, supra note 59; see also Memorandum, supra note 48. The 70 
percent duty remission applies to the following with Order-in-Council Numbers: BMW P.C. 
1985-818, Mazda P.C. 1985-812, Mercedes-Benz P.C. 1985-813, Nissan P.C. 1985-814, 
Peugeot P.C. 1985-815, Subaru P.C. 1985-816 and Toyota P.C. 1986-817; revoking various 
prior duty remission orders for those companies. Id. 
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of original equipment parts from Canada. "64 In other words, when 
an eligible manufacturer of the Remission Program exports auto-
motive components to a destination, such as original equipment for 
assembly into an automobile, the manufacturer may claim a remis-
sion of 70 percent of the duties payable on motor vehicles it im-
ports into Canada. 66 
The second level of 100 percent duty remission is available for 
those automotive production firms that make a commitment to op-
erate or are presently operating significant manufacturing facilities 
in Canada, either in vehicle assembly or major parts production.66 
Id. 
64. See Memorandum, supra note 48. 
65. See id.; see also REMISSION PROGRAM, supra note 59. An illustrated example: 
Exports Worth: 
$10,000 (of value) x 70 % (Canadian Value Added adjustment)= $7,000 
Remission: 
$7,000 x 10.2% (duty on imported automobiles)= $714 
Imports Worth: 
$100,000 (of value) x 10.2% (duty on imported automobiles)= $10,200 (duty on 
imports) 
Total Duty Owed: 
$10,200 (duty) - $714 (remission) = $9,486 
66. REMISSION PROGRAM, supra note 59; see also Memorandum, supra note 48. The 100 
percent duty remission applies to Honda, Order in Council P.C. 1986-637, Registration SJ./ 
86-38, 120 Can. Gaz. pt. II, No. 7, at 1377 (1986). The Remission Order of March 13, 1986, is 
the most recent duty remission order in the automotive sector, and grants 100 percent re-
mission of duty on automobiles and qualified parts imported by Honda Canada with two 
necessary conditions: (1) The Canadian Value Added of components exported by Honda 
must be at least equal to the customs value of the imported automobiles, and (2) Honda 
must purchase a Canadian location of at least 300 acres of land and build an automobile 
manufacturing facility on the premises and contribute to it, a total investment in machinery 
and equipment of at least $100 million Canadian dollars. 
Prior to this order, Honda had been receiving duty remission benefits at the rate of 70 
percent under the Honda Remission Order of 1984. Order in Council P.C. 1985-810 of 
March 14, 1985, Registration S.1./85-49, 119 Can. Gaz. pt. II, No. 7, at 1654, revoking Honda 
Remission Order, 1980 Order in Council P.C. 1980-2066 of July 1, 1980. 
A similar 100 percent duty remission also applies to Volkswagen under Order in Council 
P.C. 1985-1160, Registration S.1./84-61, 118 Can. Gaz. pt. II, No. 8, at 1545 (1984), which 
amended Order in Council P.C. 1983-1499, May 19, 1983, Registration S.1./83-104, 117 Can. 
Gaz. pt. II, No. 11, at 2376 (1983), revoking Order in Council P.C. 1978-2658 of August 23, 
1978, Registration S.1./78-143, 112 Can. Gaz. pt. II, No.17, at 3627. 
The Volkswagen Remission Order granted a 100 percent remission of duties and a par-
tial remission of sales tax on automobiles imported by Volkswagen with two necessary con-
ditions: (1) The Canadian Value Added of components exported by Volkswagen was re-
quired to at least equal the customs value of the imported values, and (2) Volkswagen was 
required to buy a specific existing production plant by January 1, 1982, convert it into an 
automotive component factory, invest at least $102 million Canadian dollars in machinery, 
equipment, and improvements, and start production at that facility by the end of 1983. The 
1984 amendment revised Volkswagen's investment commitment downward to $40 million 
Canadian dollars. Id. 
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For these firms to receive the full credit, they must meet a mini-
mum level of Canadian Value Added to the cost of sales at 15 per-
cent, which must be raised to a ratio of 60 percent within five 
years. 67 For component production, a Canadian Value Added to 
the cost of a sales ratio of 85 percent must be maintained.68 Under 
the 100 percent scheme, the credit on those automobiles that are 
imported is equal to the full Canadian Value Added of the Cana-
dian original equipment components exported. 69 
D. THE LEGALITY AND VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
WITH EVIDENT ADVERSE EFFECTS 
Whether the Remission Program violates any trade rules is a 
controversial issue that should be closely analyzed in accordance 
with several international agreements. According to the Canadian 
Government, an automotive producer's eligibility to receive a duty 
remission at the 70 percent level depends solely upon the firm's 
performance in the exportation of Canadian automotive compo-
nents, and not upon the individual manufacturer's amount of in-
vestment in Canada. 7° Furthermore, the Canadian Government 
states that the Remission Program is similar to those programs of-
fered by the United States, designed with the purpose of attracting 
foreign investment. 71 Thus, the Sovereign of Canada claims that 
67. REMISSION PROGRAM, supra note 59. Upon attaining the required ratios in addition 
to a production sales ratio of 1 to 1, importers receive the full duty-free status. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Memorandum, supra note 48; see also REMISSION PROGRAM, supra note 59. An illus-
trated example: 
Exports Worth: 
$10,000 (of value) x 1003 (Canadian Value Added adjustment)= $10,000 
Remission: 
$10,000 x 10.23 (duty on imported automobiles)= $1,020 (remission) 
Imports Worth: 
$100,000 (of value) x 10.2 % (duty on imported automobiles)= $10,200 (duty) 
Total Duty Owed: 
$10,200 (duty) - $1,020 (remission) = $9,180 
Id. 
70. Memorandum, supra note 48. 
71. Id. 
It might be alleged that duty remission is analogous to provisions in United States 
law, which permit remission of duties on American goods returned under items 
806.30 or 807.00 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS). This is not 
the case. TSUS 806.30 and 807 .00 allow an importer of a product assembled abroad 
from United States parts to pay duty only on the difference between the assembled 
value of the product and the value of the United States components. Both place 
strict limits on the amount of foreign processing that may occur and require the 
incorporation of the exported good. Canadian duty remission would not meet the 
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this program is not in violation of any trade regulations. 72 
However, the United States contends that the Remission Pro-
gram provides an illegal export subsidy, because the difference be-
tween the 70 and 100 percent duty remission is contingent upon a 
"location subsidy," one in which the producer's investment in Can-
ada is a necessary condition to receive the greater remission.73 
Thus, the exporting of automotive components is a sine qua non 
for the reception of remission benefits that are proportional to the 
component exports; as for each one Canadian dollar of Canadian 
Value Added exported, the "exporter/importer" gets back 10.2 
cents, or 7.14 cents under the 70 percent remission plan, in duty 
remission. 74 
The Remission Program's first international trade violation re-
fers to Article IX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).75 The Remission Program is inconsistent with the provi-
sions of the GATT, because it appears to constitute an export sub-
sidy where the duty remission benefits are directly attached to the 
Id. 
requirements of TSUS 806.30 or 807.00. For instance, it gives remission benefits for 
imported cars even where the cars include absolutely no reimported Canadian parts. 
(There is no general 806/807 - type provision in Canadian law; Canadian goods ex-
ported for processing abroad are dutiable on their full value when reimported.) 
72. Id. 
73. Id.; see also Perez, Export Subsidies in Developing Countries and the GATT, 10 J. 
WORLD TRADE L. 529, 532 (1976). A "subsidy" exists when a governmental measure, such as 
an expenditure or revenue, affects the return on an economic activity. Specifically, a subsidy 
that encourages export sales is considered a "positive" export subsidy because it is created 
to encourage domestic sales and originally set up to promote a domestic activity. Id. 
7 4. Memorandum, supra note 48. Calculation of the amount of remission per Canadian 
dollar exported under the 70 and 100 percent plans is as follows: 
70 percent plan: = 70 % adjustment x 10.23 duty on automobiles x $1 Canadian Value 
Added. 
100 percent plan: = 1003 adjustment x $1 Canadian Value Added. 
Id.; see e.g., supra notes 65, 69 and accompanying text; Perez, supra note 73, at 529, 532. 
75. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signa'ture Oct. 30, 1947, 61 
Stat. A3, T.l.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. The GATT has been mod-
ified since it was opened for signature. A current version may be found, in 4 General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (1969). The GATT 
deals with a subject area of commercial policy. The violation here is referring to GATT, 
Article IX; see also E. RossmEs, U.S. IMPORT TRADE REGULATION 416 (1986). 
In 1947, the United States and seven other major trading nations entered into the 
GATT effective January 1, 1948. This Agreement froze tariffs at their current levels 
and laid down internationally agreed trading rules, including the most favored-na-
tion trading principle. Pursuant to this principle, each GATT signatory country, 
with certain minor exceptions, afforded the lowest tariff rates to the products of any 
other country. 
Id. Today, approximately 80 percent of the world trade adheres to the GATT. Id. 
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amount of exported automotive parts.76 The "subsidy" is classified 
under Item (I) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies from the 
MTN Subsidies Agreement (Subsidies Code): 
[T]he remission or drawback of import charges in excess of those 
levied on [imported] goods that are physically incorporated ... in 
the exported product provided, however, that in particular cases a 
firm may use a quantity of home market goods equal to, and hav-
ing the same quality and characteristics, as the imported goods as 
a substitute for them in order to benefit from this provision if the 
import and the corresponding export operations both occur within 
a reasonable time period . . . . 77 
Analyzing the Remission Program under Item (I) of the Subsi-
dies Code, an export subsidy may be classified as "any import re-
bate that is linked to exports, with the exception of legitimate 
drawback or offshore assembly provisions."78 The remissions 
granted by the Canadian Government's program neither qualify as 
a drawback nor as an offshore assembly scheme because there is no 
physical tracing between the products exported and the products 
imported. 79 
Alternatively, the Remission Program is in violation of those 
international trading rules pursuant to Item (L) of the Illustrative 
List of Export Subsidies from the Subsidies Code as, "any other 
charge on the public account constituting an export subsidy in the 
sense of Article XVI of the GATT."80 Article XVI of the GATT 
defines an export subsidy as, "any subsidy ... which operates di-
rectly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to 
reduce imports of any product into, its territory .... "81 The Cana-
dian Duty Remission Program would apply the GATT Article XVI 
76. Memorandum, supra note 48. 
77. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, XXIII of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, MIN/NTM/W 236 (done Apr. 12, 1979) [hereinaf-
ter Subsidies Code], reprinted in AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF THE MUL-
TILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 257 
(1979). The Subsidies Code is based on GATT. See GATT, supra note 75. The subject area 
here refers to the Subsidies Code, as "import charges" that include such fiscal charges as 
tariffs and duties which are levied on imports. Id. 
78. Memorandum, supra note 48; see also WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
687 (3d ed. 1981) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S]. A drawback is defined as, "money remitted after 
being collected: ... customs or other duties refunded on (1) an imported product subse-
quently exported, (2) an imported product used in production of a product for export, or (3) 
on the part of an imported product which becomes scrap in the manufacturing process." Id. 
79. Memorandum, supra note 48; see also WEBSTER'S, supra note 78, at 687. 
80. Subsidies Code, supra note 77; see also Memorandum, supra note 48. 
81. GATT, supra note 75, art. XVI. 
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export subsidy definition to the current situation. 
Most importantly, the Remission Program is violating the 
United States-Canadian Auto Pact.82 The heart of the Auto Pact is 
found in article II, as automotive bilateral trade receives duty-free 
border access. 83 The Remission Program is not inconsistent with 
the provisions of article II, because the U.S. automotive manufac-
turers do not receive any remission benefits. 84 However, the Remis-
sion Program violates the Auto Pact in article I. 8 is Those pertinent 
provisions of article I, provide that the Governments of the United 
States and Canada shall achieve objectives where "the industries 
of both countries participate on a fair and equitable basis" and 
provide for "the development of conditions in which market forces 
may operate effectively to attain the most economic pattern of in-
vestment, production, and trade."86 
The agreement further states, that each country's government 
will "avoid actions which would frustrate the achievement of these 
objectives."87 Nevertheless, the Canadian Government's Remission 
Program undermines the U.S. automotive industry's ability to 
compete for foreign investment in automotive plant locations, and 
is inconsistent with the above-mentioned provisions of the Auto 
Pact.88 In addition, the unfavorable effects will be reflected by the 
82. See Auto Pact, supra note 4. 
83. Id. art. II. 
84. Id.; see also Memorandum, supra note 48. 
85. Auto Pact, supra note 4, art. I. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of the UAW). The lopsided share of new invest-
ment in Canada would adversely affect the final assembly and parts production segments of 
the automotive industry. Id.; see also id. (testimony of Thomas Hanna). As was stated at 
the hearing: 
For example, the GM-Suzuki announcement of their intention to locate a joint as-
sembly facility in Canada, rather than in the U.S., is probably attributable to the 
Pact. By locating in Canada, GM-Suzuki would be able to import the engine and 
drive train duty-free as a qualified manufacturer. Furthermore, the autos produced 
at the faculty can enter the U.S. duty-free if they contain at least 503 U.S./Cana-
dian content. However, if the facility is located in the U.S., GM-Suzuki could pay 
the duty on the engine and drive train imported into the U.S. Also GM could and 
probably does import their captives from Japan into Canada duty-free. 
Mazda, which is building its plant in Flat Rock, Michigan, right across the river 
from Windsor, Ontario, and using 50% North American content, will not be able to 
ship cars into Canada duty-free. Most of the Japanese companies producing cars in 
Canada will not only be able to ship into the U.S. duty-free but will get a kickback 
as well. Small wonder why Canada has been so successful in attracting foreign as-
sembly plants. 
In addition, Japanese automakers in the U.S. have encouraged Japanese origi-
nal equipment parts suppliers to locate near their U.S. facilities. Many of these 
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disproportionate share of job losses in automotive production em-
ployment.89 Given the importance and size of the automotive in-
dustry and the future outlook of the foreign firms to continue ex-
porting the increasing numbers of motor vehicles, the Canadian 
investment incentive would increase the U.S. trade deficit in the 
automotive sector.90 The long-term impact of the duty remission 
benefits provided by Canada would most probably create a nega-
tive and distorting effect on investment and balance of trade for 
the United States.91 The background of the Auto Pact negotiations 
supports the proposition that the Remission . Program is inconsis-
tent with the U.S.-Canadian trading relationship, because the 
elimination of the original duty remission scheme was a major mo-
tivation quid pro quo for the Auto Pact's negotiation and subse-
quent conclusion. 92 
Id. 
suppliers will locate in Canada and export parts to the U.S. duty-free in order for 
the Japanese auto manufacturer to receive a duty remission on auto exports from 
Japan to Canada. This action will further reduce sales by domestic original equip-
ment parts suppliers. At the same time, Japanese or American suppliers with U.S. 
locations will not be able to export duty-free to Honda or Toyota in Canada. 
89. Id. (testimony of the UAW). The "average monthly employment of automotive 
workers in the United States in 1985 reached 872,000, of which 676,700 or 77.5% were pro-
duction workers." Id.; see also id. (testimony of Thomas Hanna). 
90. Id. (testimony of the UAW). In 1985, the U.S. automotive trade deficit with Canada 
was $7.5 billion. Id.; see also Syracuse Herald American, Apr. 5, 1987, at A9, col. 1. Repre-
sentative William Gray, Chairman of the House Budget Committee, noted that, in 1986, the 
U.S. trade deficit with Canada reached $20 billion in automotive trade. Id.; see also Hear-
ing, supra note 2 (testimony of Thomas Hanna). 
Id~ 
The United States has historically sustained a net deficit annually in trade with 
Canada in assembled vehicles. The balance has varied year to year, reflecting chang-
ing consumer demands for varying makes and models produced in the two coun-
tries. However, the resulting deficit from this net U.S. importation of assembled 
vehicles through most of the life of [the] Auto Pact was more than compensated for 
by the large U.S. surplus in original equipment parts exported to Canada. Since 
1982, however, Canada has recorded a growing surplus in total automotive trade 
with the United States due to the strength of the U.S. dollar, strong U.S. demand 
for models built in Canada, and a stronger U.S. economic recovery from the reces-
sion of the early 1980's. These trends have led to a cumulative U.S. automotive 
trade deficit with Canada of $8.7 billion between 1982 and 1984, which offset all but 
$700 million of the accumulated U.S. automotive trade surplus with Canada during 
the 1966-1981 period. 
91. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Thomas Hanna). 
92. Memorandum, supra note 48; see also Hearing, supra note 2 (opening statement of 
John J. LaFalce). 
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IV. PLANNING AND ACTION WITH THE IMPOSED CANA-
DIAN DUTY REMISSION PROGRAM 
There are many prospective European and Asian automotive 
manufacturers that are planning to invest in the United States and 
Canada. 93 Because the provisions of the Auto Pact do not apply to 
these new producers, their choice of location may be influenced by 
the attractiveness of the Canadian Duty Remission Program. Fur-
thermore, due to the "worldwide duty-free import privileges avail-
able to Canadian producers, and the Canadian restriction of duty-
free importing to producers that reach a high level of Canadian 
content, new entrants wishing to sell cars in Canada as well as the 
United States have good reasons for locating a large proportion of 
their North American investment in Canada. "94 
There is little incentive to produce motor vehicles and auto-
motive parts in the United States, especially with the application 
of the Canadian remission rebates.95 Those few advantages that do 
exist include, trading in the larger U.S. market which establishes 
the benefit of goodwill for the particular automotive manufactur-
ing company, and reduced transportation costs due to the immedi-
ate access to major U.S. markets.96 
To promote healthy trade competition and obtain the various 
advantages that each country may contribute to the interests of 
the automotive industry, it is essential that the Governments of 
the United States and Canada attempt to accommodate each 
other's societal structures and differences, and build from those al-
ready existing strengths and values. 97 The separate governments 
may choose to take unilateral actions, which may include retalia-
tion by the United States in response to the Remission Program, 
93. Letter, supra note 23 (concerning the Canadian Duty Remission Program with re-
spect to automotive parts). Every automotive manufacturer is planning to locate in North 
America. For example, every major Japanese automotive manufacturer plans to build at 
least one assembly facility in the United States by the end of the decade. Such an example 
includes the joint venture of Isuzu and Fuji (the makers of Subaru). Id.; see also Hearing, 
supra note 2 (testimony of Marc Santucci). 
Japanese automotive manufacturer's motor vehicle assembly in the United States is 
increasing at a rapid pace. By 1990, approximately 1.7 million motor vehicles will be assem-
bled in the United States and approximately 600,000 motor vehicles will be assembled by 
Japanese or Korean automotive manufacturers in Canada. These foreign producers will be 
receiving a fairly large Canadian duty remission as at least 300,000 of those motor vehicles 
assembled in Canada could be exported to the United States. Id. 
94. Id. (testimony of the UAW). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Gotlieb, supra note 36, at 496. 
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or alternatively, the negotiation of an agreement which would en-
courage the enhanced integration of the automotive industry. 
The best means of negotiation would be to address the Cana-
dian Remission Program in an appropriate forum and at the earli-
est possible opportunity. The U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Negotia-
tions would provide a useful opportunity to address these issues 
and concerns. 98 The primary objective of the U.S. Government 
during these negotiations would be to reduce or eliminate all Cana-
dian trade barriers to U.S. exports and those Canadian programs 
or practices that impede trade with the United States.99 
Throughout these trade talks, it is important that those asso-
ciated with the automotive industry, particularly the Motor Vehi-
cle Manufacturers Association and the Motor and Equipment 
Manufacturers Association, actively participate and closely com-
municate with those governmental officials who have the authority 
to negotiate international policy.100 Industry participation is par-
98. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Thomas Hanna); see also TRADE AGREEMENTS 
PROGRAM, supra note 38. The evolution and formalization of the proposal to the United 
States to enter into a free trade arrangement between the United States and Canada in 1985 
was a major policy development for Canada. Following the March 1985 Quebec Summit 
between President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney, where the notion of bilateral 
trade liberalization was endorsed, the initiation of talks received further support from the 
Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospect for Canada and from 
the Canadian Trade Ministry. Id. at 131; see also RossmEs, supra note 75, at 487. 
The U.S. Trade Representative is the President's chief agent, and is responsible for all 
the trading functions and international negotiations. This position was established by that 
name under Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980). The U.S. Trade Representa-
tive is formally the Special Trade Representative for Trade Negotiations (acquiring the 
rank of ambassador), and is the principle coordinator of all tariff and trade agreement activ-
ities, as well as acting as the principle liaison with the legislative branch. Id. 
99. Letter, supra note 23 (concerning the Canadian Duty Remission Program with re-
spect to automotive parts); see also TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, supra note 38. The free 
trade negotiations could lead to the formation of the world's largest free -trade area, both 
geographically oriented and in terms of trade turnover. Id. at 131. 
100. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Thomas Hanna). The MVMA represents U.S. 
automobile, truck and bus manufacturers producing more than 98 percent of all the domes-
tic motor vehicles. MVMA members include: American Motors Corporation, Chrysler Cor-
poration, Ford Motor Company, General Motors Corporation, Honda of America Manufac-
turing, Inc., LTV Aerospace and Defense Company, AM General Division, M.A.N. Truck 
and Bus Corporation, Navistar International Corporation, PACCAR Inc., Volkswagen of 
America, Inc., and Volvo North America Corporation. Id.; see also id. (testimony of James 
J. Connor, Executive Vice President for the Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Associa-
tion (MEMA), concerning the United States-Canadian motor vehicle parts trade). 
Throughout MEMA's 83-year history, it has "provided services and programs to meet 
the needs of American motor vehicle product manufacturers' ... " and has been represent-
ing approximately 750 companies of U.S. automotive manufacturers producing regular and 
heavy vehicle parts, equipment, accessories and other products. Id.; see also RossmEs, supra 
note 75, at 494. 
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ticularly important in trade negotiations because any changes in 
trade policy may offset the competitive effects of those automotive 
manufacturers involved. 101 
In negotiating a settlement, a sectoral approach that would 
meet the full provisions of the GATT may be the most effective 
attempt at achieving a comprehensive free trade arrangement be-
tween the United States and Canada.102 However, the fact that 
there have been no new sectoral arrangements ratified by both gov-
ernments since the creation of the Auto Pact of 1965, indicates the 
difficulty of achieving the successful negotiations necessary to pro-
duce an agreement. 103 Furthermore, with regards to the ensuing 
The most common of the formal opportunities that are available to an industry to con-
tribute to the treaty-making process include: appearing before congressional committees to 
provide testimony, serving on advisory committees established to permit representation of 
an industry, and responding to the published invitations on pending proposals. Id. With 
respect to the Canadian Duty Remission Program, it is evident that giving testimony before 
congressional committees was a popular method of industry participation, as several organi-
zations appeared before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the House Commit-
tee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. 
101. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Thomas Hanna); see also id. (testimony of 
James J. Connor). Presently, original equipment manufacturers and suppliers have estab-
lished corporate strategies based upon the existence of the Auto Pact, and an internationally 
negotiated course of action may alter these plans. Id. 
102. Note, supra note 14, at 176; see also Syracuse Herald American, Apr. 5, 1987, at 
A9, col. 1. In the April 1987 meeting between President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulro-
ney, President Reagan acknowledged that "much hard bargaining lies ahead," but added, 
"we are optimistic that a comprehensive plan mutually beneficial and advantageous to both 
sides can be hammered out .... "Id. 
103. Trezise, supra note 14, at 63; Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1987, at 2, col. 2. As of Septem-
ber 24, 1987, the United States and Canada were unable to create a free-trade agreement 
that would be mutually beneficial to both countries. At that time, the Canadian officials 
broke off talks with the U.S. negotiators as Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney stated that 
"the negotiations are at an impasse because the United States hasn't moved on the most 
basic issue of all - a way of resolving disputes satisfactorily between the two countries." 
Canada's demand throughout these trade talks has been to create a "special binding dis-
pute-solving mechanism" to resolve trade problems involving the North American market. 
Id. It was hoped that this session of trade talks would have expanded and resolved the 
dispute-settling mechanism that Prime Minister Mulroney and President Reagan had de-
vised in the Ottawa trade talks of April. Id.; see N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1987, at Dl, col. 2. 
The mechanism so demanded by Canada consists of an arbitration panel which would 
review acts of the U.S. Congress and allow unilateral Canadian retaliatory actions when 
those Congressional acts "violate the spirit" of the trade agreement. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 
1987, at D8, col. 2. The rationale encompasses the Canadian requirement to "safeguard 
against arbitrary American opposition of import penalties against Canadian products. The 
panel would review trade cases involving [the] imposition of penalty duties by either coun-
try. The review of American decisions would be under the substantial evidence rules used in 
the Federal court system." Id.; see also Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1987, at 2, col. 2. Prime Minis-
ter Mulroney further stated that the negotiations will continue to be suspended until the 
United States addresses the issue of this dispute-settling mechanism. Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 
1987, at 2, col. 2. Take cognizance, that time is of the essence and there is no time for a 
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Free Trade Negotiations, the United States does not anticipate to 
walk-out by either negotiating party. See id. 
Congressional advocates of the free-trade pact were disappointed by the Canadian offi-
cials attitude and "walkout" of the trade talks, but supported President Reagan's views. As 
the House of Representatives Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski phrased it, "I 
am concerned about the breakdown of these negotiations, but I fully support our negotia-
tors' position on the contentious issue of dispute-settlement." Furthermore, "that position 
accurately reflects the political consensus here in Washington as to what is an achievable 
agreement." In addition, Senate Finance Chairman Lloyd Bentsen stated that Canada's po-
sition was not surprising because "we've seen increasing political opposition in Canada to 
the idea of free-trade with the United States." Nevertheless, "I would hope we could get 
these talks back on track towards a mutually beneficial agreement, though time is short. If 
these efforts fail, it would be a tragedy for both countries." Id. 
The rough road during the trade talks between the United States and Canada in Sep-
tember of 1987, further exemplifies the difficulty of a compromise solution between the two 
countries for an effective and operational free-trade arrangement. See Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 
1987, at 3, col. 1. In one last attempt, a proposed free-trade agreement was written and 
signed between the United States and Canada after "hectic last-minute bargaining," but 
now must be approved through a "politically tough ratification process" by the U.S. Con-
gress and Canadian Parliament. The agreement is considered a unique pact and was devised 
in a quick fashion to solely satisfy the October 3, 1987, midnight deadline required by Con-
gress for expedited review. 
Both countries' governmental officials and concerned parties will be carefully analyzing 
the proposed treaty's system for settling disputes to confirm the elimination of loopholes. 
This particularly concerns "an area where the U.S. made concessions by agreeing to a new 
bilateral commission whose rulings would be binding in certain cases." The U.S. lawmakers 
main intention is "to kill any pact if it exempts Canada from provisions of U.S. unfair-
trading-practices law in favor of a new mechanism." On the other hand, Prime Minister 
Mulroney will have to convince 10 provinces to approve the agreement and "overcome a 
deep public skepticism about his ability to protect Canada's interests in negotiating with the 
U.S." This is a tough feat, as a poll showed only 50 percent of Canadians are in favor of a 
free trade agreement with the United States, and while other polls had proven that the 
Canadian people feel that Prime Minister Mulroney is not an effective negotiator with the 
United States. Id.; see also N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1987, at Dl, col. 2. 
After 16 months of unsuccessful free trade negotiations, the proposed accord, which 
provides for the elimination of all tariffs and the reduction of many non-tariff barriers be-
tween the United States and Canada by January 1, 1999, is the subject of mixed emotions. 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1987, at Dl, col. 2; see id. at D8, col. 2. With regard to the automotive 
industry provisions of the agreement, the general Congressional concern was that these pro-
visions "fell short of original expectations," while the Canadian feeling strongly expressed 
objection to any "provision that would force renegotiation of the 1965 auto pact." It is, thus, 
apparent that the agreement's objective, to integrate the two nations' economies, will receive 
very close attention before any finalization. Id. at Dl, col. 3. 
Since the proposed trade pact, the Canadian feeling has been split with regard to the 
U.S.-Canadian agreement. Generally, Canadian businesses are supporting the free -trade ar-
rangement and trade unions and nationalist groups are steadfastly resisting it. Business 
leaders are enthusiastic about the prospects of competing freely in the U.S. markets, which 
dwarf Canada's own, and they see the agreement as providing at least a measure of security 
against growing American protectionism. Opponents say the new system for regulating trade 
disputes gives no real protection against American industries' increasing propensity to seek 
trade penalties against imports, and they forecast severe damage to Canada as a result of 
changes in automotive trade arrangements, investment review practices and energy policies 
that Canada has pledged. Id. 
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accede to a reduced subsidy or similar substitute.104 There are U.S. 
officials who have serious doubts about the success of these negoti-
ations, because with the belief that the subsidy itself is illegal, 
there would be no terms to negotiate. lOG 
Instead, a unilateral, retaliatory action may be implemented 
by the United States in the form of a countervailing duty.106 Coun-
tervailing duty law would be applicable to the Remission Pro-
gram's schemes if those Canadian-manufactured automotive com-
ponents are: (1) determined by the Commerce Department to be 
benefited from subsidies that are more than de minimus, and (2) 
determined by the International Trade Commission that those 
subsidized imports cause or threaten material injury to the U.S. 
automotive industry in the production of such automotive 
components.107 
Negotiations should also be considered in conjunction with the 
The Canadian Government expects this "highly contentious issue," to be an issue of 
much debate with little room for each side to compromise. However, this was somewhat 
expected as the three past attempts of a free-trade agreement with the United States in the 
past century, had proven a failure. Id. 
Another obstacle for the free-trade agreement's approval, in addition to the U.S. Con-
gress' opposition to the dispute mechanism, is internal opposition within Canada by the 
Provincial Premiers. Id.; see Syracuse Post Standard, Oct. 10, 1987, at 83, col. 1. Clayton 
Yeutter, the U.S. Trade Representative, stated that the United States will not ratify the 
negotiated free-trade pact unless all 10 Canadian Provinces agree to its binding effect. He 
further stated that the United States will not deal separately with the individual Provinces 
as only the Federal Government in Canada has the power to effectuate international treaties 
with the United States. However, it appears that there is sparked Provincial opposition to 
the free-trade agreement. Such Provincial Premiers as David Peterson of Ontario and How-
ard Pawley of Manitoba have expressed their opposition to acceptance of the future treaty. 
Their resistance stems, in part, from the foreseen loss of Canadian identity due to the closer 
interaction with the American economy. Syracuse Post Standard, Oct. 10, 1987, at 83, col. 1. 
Clayton Yeutter has indicated that approval of the agreement would benefit the Cana-
dian economy moreso than that of the United States and has predicted "an expansion in the 
$135 billion annual volume in what already is the world's biggest trading partnership." Fi-
nally, he concluded by stressing the importance of the treaty's approval by stating that, "the 
world will never be the same and our bilateral relations will never be the same . . . . " 
without it. Id. 
104. Letter, supra note 23. 
105. Id. Dingell states that, "it is not at all clear what there is to negotiate when the 
subsidy is illegal." Id. 
106. See Tariff Act, supra note 23. For a further explanation of countervailing duties, 
see infra note 107 and accompanying text; see also RossmEs, supra note 75, at 241. A do-
mestic producer of a similar product may have a remedy in the form of a countervailing 
duty when the foreign manufacturer's export is subsidized. Id. 
107. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-39, § l(a), 93 Stat. 44 (July 26, 1979) 
(amending 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1930)). This act added title VII, Countervailing and Anti-
Dumping Duties, which would apply to exports from a "country" under the agreement. Id.; 
see also Letter, supra note 23. 
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Auto Pact. Since the Auto Pact has provided a stable trading 
framework from 1965 to the present, simple modifications may be 
all that is needed to uphold its operating effectiveness between the 
United States and Canada.108 One such suggestion to modify the 
Auto Pact is proposed by the United Auto Workers (UAW), stat-
ing that the minimum North American Value Added for duty-free 
entry of motor vehicles and original equipment components into 
the United States should be raised to 75 percent from the present 
50 percent. 109 Due to the growing interest of foreign automotive 
manufacturers selling their products in the North American mar-
ket, the percentage increase would reduce the potential for the use 
of components imported into Canada from non-U.S. locations.110 
Those imported components are assembled into motor vehicles in 
Canada and continue to be granted duty-free access to the United 
States. m Thus, the change in the domestic content requirement 
would more effectively reduce the benefits of the Auto Pact to the 
foreign producers selling in the North American market.112 
V. CONCLUSION 
Recent events, including the potential investment of foreign 
automotive producers in North America, the Canadian Duty Re-
mission Program, the ensuing U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Negotia-
tions and the unbalanced bilateral automotive trade, raise a ques-
tion as to whether a retaliatory or a compromising approach should 
be pursued to preserve the joint goals of a fair and equitable North 
American automotive trade industry. A unilateral or retaliatory 
strategy applied by each country in the bilateral trading environ-
ment, would more than likely terminate the Auto Pact or at least 
reduce the scope of its terms.113 This approach would not be the 
best solution, as it would generate a political controversy between 
the two countries and result in a substantial reduction of U.S.-
Canadian trade and investment. m 
108. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of the UAW). 
109. Id. The UAW proposal for the increase to 75 percent is appropriate because where 
those foreign based manufacturers set up operations in the United States, experience has 
illustrated that "only a minimal number of domestically sourced parts can be transformed 
into 50 % of the final products value by the addition of assembly labor, management com-
pensation, overhead and profits." Id.; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
110. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of the UAW). 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. (testimony of Thomas Hanna). 
114. Id. 
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Alternatively, if the U.S. and Canadian Governments work to-
ward the development of an integrated automotive industry, the 
automotive trade industries of both countries will prosper, as well 
as the general welfare of their respective economies. Should an 
agreement be reached between the United States and Canada, the 
UAW proposes the addition of certain provisions to require the au-
tomatic initiation of continuing talks upon the finding of a speci-
fied imbalance of automotive trade or with regards to any product 
group not maintaining a minimum level for any calendar year.115 
These negotiations would act as a "stop-gate" before the imbalance 
gets any worse and, in turn, determine its causes and suggest steps 
for its correction. 116 
The U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Negotiations are presently the 
center of attention for the continued success of U.S.-Canadian bi-
lateral trade. To provide for a mutually beneficial outcome of this 
trade problem, each government must consider the changing condi-
tions of the automotive industry and evaluate the entire motor ve-
hicle manufacturing sector in light of its importance to both coun-
tries' economies.117 Only through such dedication and cooperation, 
can the United States hope to maintain Canada as a vital trading 
ally. 
David A. Cohen 
115. Id. (testimony of the UAW). The product level refers to the categories of comme.r-
cial vehicles, cars, or parts. Id. 
116. Id. The U.S. automotive trade deficit with Canada is too important an issue, and if 
it should grow, it cannot be disregarded. The international agreement would be temporarily 
suspended if the imbalance is not reduced below the target level within the subsequent year, 
and until such time it is adequately reached. Id. 
117. Id. (testimony of Thomas Hanna). 
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